US Sanctions Bill Targets Russian Oil Buyers, While Leaving Uranium Trade Loopholes

The United States is moving to intensify economic pressure on countries that continue to purchase Russian oil and gas, even as its own nuclear sector remains subject to limited exceptions for Russian nuclear fuel.

The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 would give President Donald Trump the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries that continue buying Russian energy and meet the legislation’s criteria.

At the same time, the legislation maintains a more complicated framework for civilian nuclear cooperation and Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU), reflecting Washington’s continuing efforts to reduce dependence on Moscow without disrupting the US nuclear fuel supply chain.

The US House of Representatives approved the sanctions legislation by 262-159 after the Senate passed it 86-11 in August. A White House official told news agency ANI that Trump intends to sign the legislation, although a specific timeline has not been announced.

The bill targets Russia’s energy and defence industries, financial networks and shadow fleet, while also introducing additional measures related to Iran.

It could also expose major buyers of Russian oil and gas, including India and China, to tariffs of up to 100 per cent if the President chooses to exercise that authority.

• Russian Uranium Remains A Complicated Issue
• Russian uranium occupies a different position within the US sanctions framework.

Washington had already restricted imports of Russian low-enriched uranium under the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which became law in 2024. However, the legislation includes a waiver mechanism allowing the Energy Secretary, in consultation with the State and Commerce departments, to approve certain Russian LEU imports when no viable alternative is available to maintain the operation of a US nuclear reactor or nuclear company, or when the imports are considered to be in the national interest.

Under the existing framework, such waivers cannot continue beyond January 1, 2028.

The scale of America’s dependence on foreign uranium enrichment helps explain the continued flexibility.

The US Department of Energy has previously acknowledged that Russia supplied roughly 20-25 per cent of the enriched uranium used by the United States before Washington began efforts to reduce that reliance.

Data from the US Energy Information Administration also shows that Russian enrichment remains significant. In 2025, Russian-origin enrichment accounted for around 26 per cent of the separative work units (SWU) purchased by US civilian nuclear reactor operators.

US-based enrichment accounted for about 23 per cent, while France, the UK and the Netherlands supplied much of the remaining capacity.

New Sanctions Do Not Amount To A Complete Uranium Ban

The Graham sanctions legislation directs the administration to enforce existing restrictions on Russian uranium, including uranium linked to Rosatom and its subsidiaries.

However, the legislation does not translate into an unrestricted or immediate ban on every Russian nuclear-fuel transaction.

Reports have pointed to provisions preserving certain forms of civilian nuclear cooperation and specified LEU imports, alongside the waiver mechanisms already available under US law.

As a result, Russian uranium remains subject to restrictions, but narrowly defined exceptions can continue where supply availability or national-interest considerations apply.

The distinction is important because replacing Russian enrichment capacity is considerably more difficult than replacing supplies of many conventional commodities.

Nuclear fuel passes through several stages, including uranium conversion and enrichment, and Russia remains one of the world’s major enrichment providers.

Washington is therefore pursuing two objectives simultaneously: reducing its long-term dependence on Russian nuclear fuel while avoiding disruptions that could affect the US reactor fleet.

The Energy Department has committed billions of dollars toward expanding domestic enrichment and nuclear fuel production as the US seeks alternative sources.

India Could Face Further Pressure Over Russian Oil

The legislation has particular significance for India because of its provisions targeting countries that continue purchasing Russian energy.

The bill gives Trump the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on qualifying countries that continue buying Russian oil and gas. India is among the countries that could potentially come under the provision.

However, the 100 per cent tariff would not be automatic. It would require a decision by the President to exercise the authority provided by the legislation.

Washington had already imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods in August over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. According to reports, that move brought total US tariffs on some Indian exports to 50 per cent.

India has defended its purchases of Russian energy by citing energy security and the need to maintain reliable supplies.

Indian Ambassador to the US Vinay Mohan Kwatra has described energy sourcing as a “fundamental national responsibility”, while highlighting India’s position as the world’s third-largest energy consumer and its relatively low per-capita energy consumption.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs has said it is monitoring developments and remains committed to maintaining diversified sources of energy.

Why The Nuclear Exception Matters

The different treatment of Russian oil and nuclear fuel highlights the structure of the US nuclear supply chain rather than indicating that Russian uranium is free from sanctions.

Washington has already taken legislative steps to reduce imports of Russian uranium while retaining mechanisms for limited purchases when alternative supplies are unavailable or other specified conditions are met.

The new sanctions legislation reinforces restrictions on Russian uranium but does not completely remove the existing nuclear-sector exceptions.

This creates a notable contrast: the US can potentially impose significant economic pressure on countries purchasing Russian crude while its own nuclear industry retains limited access to Russian-origin uranium or enrichment services under defined circumstances.

The situation also illustrates the challenges involved in rapidly severing economic links with Russia in strategically important industries.

Although Washington is investing heavily in alternative nuclear fuel supplies and domestic enrichment, official US data shows that Russian enrichment still accounted for more than one-quarter of the SWU purchased by US civilian nuclear reactor operators in 2025.